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and NBERI. Introduction
Within the last year. substantial increases in cigarette taxes have been either proposed or
legislated at both the federal and state levels. The Clinton administration called for a 75 cenL per pack
increase in the federal tax, and a Congressional subcommittee recently proposed an increase of $1.01 per
pack. çvera1 states have already legislated increased cigarette taxes. Whether these increases are
intended to reduce smoking or raise revenue, their success will depend on the extent to which firms and
consumers respond by increasing their tax evasion efforts. It is not surprising, then, to find concerns in
the popular press over increased cigarette smuggling.'
Not since the late 1970s has there been such concern over cigarette smuggling. In the early to
mid seventies, interstate cigarette smuggling was serious enough that several states appealed to the
federal government for assistance and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR,
1977) recommended federal legislation prohibiting the interstate transportation of contraband cigarettes.
In response. Congress passed the Contraband Cigarette Act (CCA) of 1978 which prohibited single
shipments. sale, or purchase of more than 60.000 cigarettes not bearing the tax indicia of the state in
which they are found. It is commonly believed that smuggling declined significantly after this and that
the decline was due to the federal intervention:
The Commission concludes that the incidence of cigarette smuggling has declined significantly
since 1977. due in large part. to the passage of the Federal Cigarette Contraband Act in 1978.
(ACIR 1985, p. 4).
Thus. until the recent movement to increase taxes. cigarette smuggling had ceased to be a major policy
issue.
With existing models, however, it is difficult to assess the impact on interstate smuggling of
either the CCA or the proposed federal tax increase. In this paper. we develop and estimate a model of
commercial smuggling which allows us to examine both policy issues. Estimation of commercial
smuggling is important for the analysis of both policies, and it is a major difference between our study
tFor example, see The WallStreet low-nat,March 30 ("Tax cut spins Canada cigarette sales") and April 5, 1994
('Canada's Taxing Pols Outwitted by Underground Economy") and TheChicagoTribune. March 31. 1994 "Fewer
smokers or more bootleggers?". Groups expressing concern range from health advocates and government officials
to the Tobacco Institute, which has an incentive to discourage legislators from increasing taxes.1
andothers. The bulk of the literature on smuggling focuses on casual smuggling by consumers who
cross state borders to take advantage of lower taxes in border states.2 It is unlikely that the CCA could
have affected this type of smuggling because it pertained to single loads in excess of 300 packs. This
most likely omits even the most avid smoker among consumers who smuggle. It is also unlikely that a
changejn the federal tax would affect consumer smuggling across state lines. An increase in the federal
tax might. affect consumer smuggling across national borders, but that is not our primary interest. Our
interest is interstate smuggling by firms. and any impact of the federal tax in our analysis occurs through
its effect on firm costs (and, therefore, equilibrium industry behavior)
In Section [1 we deveLop a theoretical model in which firms smuggle itt order to evade excise
taxes in a high (ax state. Firms choose the quantity of cigarettes to sell in a given state and the portion of
sales on which to pay the state tax, takIng as given the behavior of rival firms, the manufacwrer's price.
and enforcement parameters. The equilibrium we examine is one in which some firms pay lax on all
sales while others smuggle a portion of their sales in order to evade the state tax. The portion of tax-
paid sales in the state is a function of the state tax, the cost associated with acquiring and camouflaging
smuggled cigarettes, expected penalties in the event of failure, as well as market parameters.
hi Section III we derive an empirically estimable version of this function. In addition to the fac-
tors mentioned above, the estimation procedure involves estimating consumer demand. This allows us to
account for the types of smuggling done by consumers, namely casual smuggling across stale borders arid
smuggling from military bases and Indian reservations. The model is estimated using annual data from
1972-1990. This period contains both the enactment of the CCA in 1978 and an increase in the federal
excise tax in 1983, enabling us to examine effects of both policies. Sections IV-VI report those results.
as well as revenue losses associated with commercial smuggling.
Contrary to the ACIR conclusion, we find Federal entry into contraband cigarette enforcement
had the opposite of the intended effect. According to our estimates, commercial smuggling increased
slightly in 1979 and fell in the early eighties, but it would have decreased in all years and the decrease
2See, for example. Balcagi and Levin (1986), Baltagi and (Joel (1987), Hamilton (1982),.Warner (1982), and
Manchester (1973) The ACIR (1985) study discussescommercialsmuggling, but it does not distinguish between
commercial and casual smuggling in its estimation.3
wouldhave been even greaterifthe act had not been passed. While this may seem surprising, we argue
inSection IV thatitcanbeexplained in terms of a combination of factorsrelatedto the reaction of
enforcement agencies to passage ofthe law.3Section Vshowstheresults are robusttoalternative non-
constantelasticity variants of the model. SectionVIreports the other somewhat surprisingresult,that art
increase in the federal excise tax increases the portionof cigarettes smuggled.Tounderstand the result,
recallthat our model includesfinns who smuggle a fraction of their salesand firms whose sales are
entirely legal.An increaseinthe federal taxincreases costsfor bothtypes offirms, leading to a reduction
in their equilibrium sales. As showninSection VI, an increase in thefederal taxwill be associatedwith
anincrease in the portion of cigarettes smuggled for a sufficient reduction in sales by nonsmuggling
firms. Section VII concludcs.
As noted earlier, the literature on cigarette smuggling tends to focus on casual smuggling by
consumers.Incontrast, the literature on smuggling in international trade is primarily devoted to models of
smuggling by firms.Themodel closest to ours is Thursby. Jensen, and Thursby's (TJT. 1991) model of
camouflaging, inwhich sonic.but notall, firmsin amarket pay tariffs on a portionoftheir imports in
orderto camouflage smuggled imports. Although the focus of their theoretical work is imports, they
present empirical evidence on therelevanceofthemodel to interstate cigarette smuggling in the United
States. We differ from TJT in two respects. In the theoretical analysis, we make assumptions on the tax
structure and eriforcenient that aremoreappropriate tothecigarette case.In addition, wederivean
empirically estimable smuggling function that allows for estimation of the extent of smuggling.
IL A Theoretical Model of Commercial Smuggling
In this section. we present a model of cigarette distribution in which some. but not all, firms
smuggle in order to evade state excise taxes. We adopt 'firs assumptions on market structure and the
form of smuggling. but we differ in the treatment of taxes and penalties for tax evasion. Finns who
smuggle are able to evadetaxeson only a portion of their sales because tax-paid sales are necessary to
3Warner (1982) noiesthat any declinein smuggling in the early eighties couldhave been dueto the reduction in
real tax differences that occurred with increasing rates of inflation. However, as with the ACIR (1985) study,
Warnerdoes not estimate the extentofcommercialsmuggling.4
camouflage&nuggled cigarettes.The market isquasi-competitive inthat a finite number of firms compete
asCoumot rivals, but as the number of firms increases, output and price approach the competitive
outcome. Each firm makes its decisions taking as given its rivals' behavior, the manufacturer's price. tax
structure, and government enforcement. K is in modeling the last two parameters that we deviate from
TJT. Their theoretical analysis focuses on smuggling when firms face ad valorem taxes and the only
penalty for smuggling is confiscation. These assumptions are inappropriate for our case since cigarette
taxes are per unit and penalties include fines andlor imprisonment in addition to confiscation.4
Consider the decision problem of the ith cigarette distributor who purchases cigarettes either
front the manufacturer or from an out-of-state wholesaler for sale in state s. The state government levies
an excise tax ofT5 per unit sold. If the firm pays the tax on all units sold, its profits are
(1) [P(Q) —w —ci —Tç—T5]q
where P(Q) is inverse demand facing firm i. Qisthe quantity of cigarettes sold by all finns in s, w is the
manufacturer's price, I is the federal tax, c is cost associated with transportation and/or retailing, and q
is the quantity sold by firm i.
Alternatively, the firm may try to avoid paying the tax on (1 —))qof its sales and report sales of
liqi, where y c1is the portion of sales on which it pays the state tax. In reality, this can occur in a
variety of ways, but a common one is for a firm to purchase (I —yj)qcigarettes from a wholesaler in a
low tax state,j, paying T per unit plus a premium to the wholesaler not to affix tax indicia to the ciga-
rettes (ACIR, l985), The smuggling firm then affixes counterfeit indicia for tax payment in S.
4Dara front the ACIR (1985) suggest that state penalties are relatively low. Fines appear more prevalent than
prison sentences, and stare fines appear lower than those for a federal conviction. Our results for 1979-1984 show
that the value of confiscations was less than one-tenth of one percent of estimated values for the amount
smuggled..
5Athough some cigarettes are hijacked. we do not model hijacking. Tax administrators we interviewed indicated
that they receive manufacturers' accounts of cigarettes sold to distributors, making it difficult to smuggle
cigarettes purchased from the manufacturer. The mechanism we model is harder to detect, and enforcement
evidence suggests it is a common method.5
Enforcement efforts make this a risky activity.We incorporatethisaspectof smuggling by introducing a
parameter, e. to denote the level of enforcemenL and we express p. the probability firm i success fi.illy
smuggles a unit, as a function of e. Iris also natural to assume this probability is a function of the
portion of its sales the firm attempts to smuggle. We assume pQ, e) is increasing and concave in •yj and
decreasing, and concave in e. in addition, p(, e) E(0.1] for all yj. p(O, e) = 0 for all e. and
p(l. e) =p(t0) =I.As noted earlier. finns caught smuggling are subject to fines, imprisonment, and
confiscation of cigarettes. We assume expectations are rational, so that (I —p(.))is the true fraction of
finn i's sales that are detected and confiscated. Thus, expected profit for a firm who tries to evade taxes in
saregiven by
(2) Cit1(P(Q) —T5flq1 +(p(,e)P(Q) —Ti— E1ft1 —)qi
—[w+c +TJq
where E =ea+F[1 —p(.e)J represents per unit excess smuggling cost The first term in E repre-
sents costs incurred by the firm whether or not it is successful in smuggling. The parameter a is in-
cluded to differentiate firms by their ability and cost of smuggling. One could think of ai representing
the premium paid to a wholesaler in a low tax stare. If the finn's management has established ties with
the wholcsaler,6 it may pay a lower premium than others. Managers may also differ in their ability and
for experience in camouflaging. The second component of E represents fines (or an imputed cost asso-
ciated with imprisonment) and is incurred only if the firm's smuggling efforts are unsuccessful. F is a
constant per unit, so that the expected fine is decreasing and concave in Yi
Notice that (1) and (2) are equivalent when yj =I.In addition, our specification of (1) and (2)
implies that firms sell a homogeneous product. Even though cigarettes are differentiated, this specifica-
tion can be justified since firms carry many of the same brands. We abstract from issues related to prod-
uct differentiation prim arily because our data are for all cigarettes, which precludes any such analysis.
Aggregate data also preclude our distinguishing between wholesale and retail sates, hence our model will
6Itis reported in ACIR (1985) that some smuggling firms have purchased wholesale firms in low tax states so as
tolower their smuggling costs.6
abstractfrom whetherthe firm operates at thewholesaleand/or retaillevels.It should also benoted that
(2) impliesany confiscatedcigarettesareresoldbythegovernment.
Each firm is assumed to choose q and yj so as to maximize expected profit given by (2). Under
theassumption of Coumot behavior, the first order conditions for an interior solution to the firm's pub-
1cm are:
(3) &Crq/dq=[P(Q)+'(Q)qJftj + (1—)p(Ti• e)J
—Lw +ci-Tf+'flh +(I—tlCIj +Ei)]=0
(4) &Clti/?TiP(Q)[l +(l—)3p/&—p(.e)I+[T +E+(l —Ti)FJp/￿J— T5 =0
Equation(3) impliesthefirm should expand salesinstate s until expected marginal revenue equals mar-
ginal cost, aiul given any nonnegative qj, equation (4) determines the optimal value of y. which we de- -
note by yj r f(q; e. 1's, I.F. at)where q = Iq q1.Underour assumptions, af1/aq=afaq3c0.for
alli, j= 1,...n5,?f/ae> 0. af1/aT5 cO. af/aT>0, dfj/OF>0,and&fi/da>0 whenever I>Ti>0.
The equality of own and cross effects of sales foUows from the fact that rival sales affect the fraction of
legal sales only through the inverse demand term. P(Q). in (4). Under our assumption that the govern-
ment resells confiscatedgoods atthemarketprice. Qis simplythe sum of allsales instate s (legal or
not).7
Firm iwill smugglesome,butnot all,of its salesin state s (1 > yj>0) whenever
(5) [P(OJ+Ffll+dp(0. e)/&-flJ>T5—T1—ea >0
This is because d ti/&Ti simplifies to T +ea—T5 when y =I.Tj +ea1represents the expected mar-
ginal cost from switching a unit of sales from legal to illegal. When this is less than the marginal benefit
from the switch. 'F, it is opt.im al for the firm to attempt to smuggle some of its sales. At the other ex-
treme ( =0).[P(OJ +F)[1 +dp(0.e)/dyj +Ij+earepresents the firm's excess cost and expected loss
71I confiscated cigarettes are rEsold, ?(Q)representsinverse demand. but if ihey are destroyed. the firm's inverse
demand is a function of its rival's smuggling behavior and the probability of success. See TTF, p. 794 for a
discussion of how alternative assumptions on confiscation would affect the own and cross effects of sales.7
(mm tines and confiscation. If this exceeds the marginal benefit, T5, the finn will pay taxes in state s on
some portion of its sales.
To define the market equilibrhun. it is useful to restate the finn's problem as maximizing cx
pected profit subject to =4(q).where expected profit is given by
(6)fl =[P(Q)—T5]4(q)q +fp(ti(°Je)P(OJ —'5—E](l
—f(q))q
—[w+c +T1Jq1.
The finn's sales are then determined by
(7) [P(OJ +P'(OJq]f(q)+(I—f(q))p(f(q).e)J
=[w+c1+Tf+f(Q)Ts +(1—1(q))(T +
where4(u)isdefined by (4). For interior solutions to (4), the fact that 3f/3q cO implies that expected
marginal and average cost are declining in qj. Thus, as in TJT, we assume fl1 is concave in q so that a
unique maximum exists. The market equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium vector of sales. (q1* q*)
such that fl1(q*) ￿ U(q. qj*) for all q1e [0. K] where K is a real number such that P(Q) =0forQ ￿ K>
Oaridforalli=IN.
Now suppose there are two types of finns, differentiated only by the excess smuggling cost pa-
rameter, a. Type 1 firms have a1, which is low enough that (5)holds,and type 2 finns have a2 which is
high enough that (5)doesnot hold. The payoff function for type I finns is (6) evaluated at =4(q)
(0,1) and the payoff function for type 2 finns is (6) evaluated at 4(q) E1.Because finns are identical
except fora. we can express the equilibrium level of sales in states as Qi =Nlql*+N2q2*.where
N1 and N, are the number or type I and 2 firms, respectively. Each type I finn will pay l' on a frac-
tion, y' =f(Q).of its sales,8 and q1* q* •j*,andQ'areimplicitly defined by
(8) (P(Q) +P'(0Jq1][.y +(1—Yi)P('Yi) e)]
=[w+c+Tf+'y1T5+(l—y1)(TJ+E1)],and
8We can express y1 in this way because of the equality of the own and cross effect of sales and the fact that type
two flrms are identical.8
(9)(P(OJ+F(OJq2JW+c+Tf+T5.
Inthe next section, we develop an empirically estimable version of yU, but first it is useful to
note comparative static properties of the theoretical model. Since 7i =f(Q*;e, T. T. F, a1) where Q
=q1*÷ N2q2*. the comparative static results may differ in sign, as well as magnitude from those
on -fl stated earlier. For example, a change in T5 affects y' directly (see equation 4). but it will also
affectyj *Lhioughits effects on q 1 *andq* The direct effect is negative, but the sales effects are
ambiguous, so that we cannot sign the effect of a change in the T5 on the equilibrium fraction of state
tax-paid sales. An increase in T3 or any of the excess smuggling cost parameters (e, a1. or F) wiJl
increase sales of non-smuggling firms and the fraction of smugglers legal sales, but will decrease the
total sales of smugglers. Increases in the federal tax. manufacture?s price or transport cost act somewhat
differently because they affect per unit cost of legal and illegal sales, while the tax in state j or the en-
(orcement parameters only affcct the cost of smuggled cigarettes. In general. we cannot sign the effect of
an increase in the federal tax or manufacturers price, but in the special case of linear demand, either has
the intuitively expected effect of reducing both sales of non-smugglers and total sales of smuggling
finns. -
IlLAn Empirical Model of Commercial Smuggling
In this Section we develop an empirically estimable ftmction for tax paid sales in a state as a frac-
lion of total sales (legal and illegal) in the state. Although this function is similar 1071*. it takes into ac-
count issues of estimation and data availability not considered in our theoretical analysis. In Section A
we derive an estimating equation that allows us to account for the fact that market data reflect smuggling
by consumers as well as the commercial smuggling of interest to us. We also explain the variables used
to reflect taxes and enforcement parameters. Section B is devoted to a discussion of data and the estima-
tion procedure.9
A.Estimating Equation
We address three types of cigarette smuggling.9 First, "casual" smuggling is done by consumers
in high tax states who cross state lines to purchase cigarettes in low tax states. The second type is the
sale of tax free cigarettes on American Indian reservations and military installations to non-Indians and
non-military personnel. This smuggling, like the first, is thought to be primarily smuggling by con-
su.rners.
Organizedorcommercial smuggling by firms is the third type, and the one targeted by the CCA.
This type of smuggling often involves firms purchasing tax-paid cigarettes in low tax states and is the
type modeled in Section II. Note that with this type of smuggling, cigarettes are legal in the state where
they are purchased because the low tax state's excise tax is paid. However, the wholesaler in the low tax
state is paid not to affix the local tax indica. The primary sources for such cigarettes are the tobacco
producing (and lowest tax) states North Carolina and, to a lesser extent. Kentucky and Virginia. Table 1
presents the per capita tax paid cigarette sales is these three out-smuggling states as well as the U.S. aver-
age for selected years. Smuggling is not thought to have been a problem in 1965 when the largest differ-
ence in taxes (excluding local taxes) with other states was $.46 (in 1990 prices) and few states had differ-
ences larger than S.30. Per capita sales in KY and VAtO for 1965 are similar to the U.S. average. By
1970 many states had tax differences close to $.40 and per capita tax paid cigarette sales in the three out-
smuggling states had risen well above the U.S. average. The primary reason for this rise is thought to be
the increasing tax differentials.
We start with a standard cigarette demand function which treats cigarettes in neighboring states
as a substitute for "local" cigarettes, arid which accounts for the presence of non-tax paid sales on military
bases and Indian reservations. Our initial demand equation is
Mail-order sales of cigarettes are an additional source. Such smuggling is thought to be of minor importance
(ACW 1977; Maltz. Edelhurtz. and Chamberlain (1976) report mail-order smuggling to be on the decline) since
mailfraud statutesapply 10 the activity and because of the difficulty in smuggling large quantities of cigarettes
while, at the same time, avoiding detection by postal authorities.
LUDataon NC are unavailable as only data on tax paid sales are gathered and NC did not tax cigarettes in 1965.10
(10)InQst 8s + l3ilP1'5t + liiLNC + 3t + 4ln(AVRP5tiRP5t) + I35InCAN5t
+ MLLITARYSX1I1TA;L + ftjINDIAN5XthTAX5 + tig1t1Qst j+
+ + IslnQst.i +£st
The subscripts t= 1lands =IN refer to the year and state. respectively, of the observation.
Variables are defined as follows:
Q =percapita cigarette demand.
RF retail price.
iNC state per capita income.
=timetrend
CAN =ratioof avenge tax in adjacent Canadian provinces to tax in state s if
state s is adjacent to any Canadian provinces, otherwise CAN=l -
MILITARY=percentmilitary in state s.
INDIAN =percentAmerican Indian in state s.
TAXstate cigarette excise tax.
AVRP =theaverage retail price of cigarettes in adjacent stares,
£ =randomerror assumed to be distributed 14(0, a. -
Theparameters 5 allow for a different constant term for each state. A fixed effects model is estimated in
order to adjust for any demographic differences across states that might lead to different cigarette de
mand; we assume that demographic changes over our sample period were unimportant with respect to
cigarette demand. We allow for heteroscedasticity by assuming a different disturbance variance for each
state. Below we relax the constant elasticity assumption with respect to price and income.
A time trend is included to account for (apparent) declines in cigarette smoking due to advertised
adverse health effects; the sign of its coefficient. Il3 is expected to be negative. AVRP5t and CAN5t are
measures of the incentive for consumer to cross borders to purchase cigarettes. States with cigarette
prices generally lower than that of their neighbors will observe higher demand (ceterisparibus) forciga-
relies due to out-smuggling of cigarettes by consumers from neighboring states; the opposite occurs irtII
states with prices generally higher than their neighbors.1' We do not have available information. on av-
erage retail prices in Canada hence we usetaxrates. AVRP (CAN) are introduced In ratio with RP (local
state tax rate) simply for ease of presentation: by doing so we can interpret Piasthe price elasticity of
demand netofany cross -bordering smuggling by consumers.12 Canada and neighboring states enter
separately because of the added difficulty in crossing the US/Canadian border. Data on Mexico arc un-
available, and, in addition, we can find no mention of smuggling across the USfMexican border as a
problem.
MILITARY5tXInTAX5t arid INDIAN5tXIflTAX5t are included since sales of cigarettes on Indian
reservaLions and military bases are free of state taxes. and military bases and indian reservations have
often been mentioned as a source for smuggled cigarettes. Tight control of sales on military bases (e.g..
sates only to military personnel or dependents and Limits on the number of canons sold to a consumer)
would suggest that any smuggling off military bases would be casual. It is not clear whether smuggling
off Indian reservations is done solely or primarily by consumers. We assume that casual smuggling is
the primary form of this smuggling)3 Large indian and/or military populations should lead to decreased
demand for cigarettes sold through tax paid outlets, but total demand will be higher since cigarette prices
are tower ott bases and reservations and this may spill over into tax paid cigarette sales (our observed
quantity). In addition, it is well known that cigarette smoking is more prevalent among the military than
among civilians. For these reasons we are unable to hypothesize signs on 136 and 13j.
11We also considered the ratio of taxes in neighboring states as well as retail prices in neighbonng states
because smuggling by consumers is confined primarily to what might be loosely temied weconomicN regions
where factor costs are similar. In the area where a casual smuggler operates one could argue Iliac price
differentials are due primarily to tax differences. That is. a price difference that leads to casual snuggling is a
difference due primarily to lax differences rather than to price differences stemmingfrom,say, differing labor
costs. Results using the two measures are very similar so we only repon the results based on prices (which is the
measure typically used by other researchers).
12Onlythe standard error of the estimate of {3 is affected by using ratios.
This assumption should have little, if any, effect on our estimates of the extent ot' organized smuggling since
our measure of the incentive for organized smuggling is the difference in a states excise tax with the excise tax in
North Carolina which remained at two cents throughout our sample period. if we were to introduce separately the
incentive for firms to smuggle off Indian reservations we would use the local state tax rate which is almost
perfectly collinear with the tax difference with North Carolina.12
Data available on cigarette sales are art "tax-paid" or "legal" sates: we only observe the portion
of the ith states cigarette demandfor whichthe ith state's taxes are paid In the absenceofcommercial
smuggling wewouldobserve Q(which. ofcourse.reflectsthe demand orsupplyofcigarettesfrom
neighboring states). In the presence of commercial smuggling we observe the portion of sales that are
legal. Define y, 0 <y ￿ 1, to be the fraction of demand in the sth state in year t which is not supplied
or "bootlegged" into the state by commercial smugglers. In equilibrium Yst equals tax-paid sales as a
fraction of total sales in the stateJ4 That is, we observe 4t= iQtrather than Q51(orYst)' where L is
the per capita quantity of legal sales in state a in year t. Substituting the accounting identity Qa t-st+
S5into the above, where S5 is the level of commercial smuggling in state s at time t, we solve for the
leveloforganized smuggling activity as
(11) S5 L5t(l Yst)'Yst'
Yst is unobserved, but it is estimable, its theoretical analog is a function of the level of enforcement as
well as the tax differential with the low-tax states. The functional form chosen is
Yst =expIÔ1TAXD1F5t +5,TAXD1F+ 53ENFORCE51
+ ö4RPsixTAXDWst + w5txTAXDIF5)
where
TAXDIF =thedifference in the tax rate in state s and the tax in the low tax
state where purchases are made by organized smugglers.
ENFORCE =thelevel of enforcement (representing E1 in the theoretical model),
and w5 is a random error assumed to be distributed N(0, a,).
Enforcement level is unobserved, but it is a function of a set of observable variables. We con-
sider this below, though we note for now the reasonable assumption that ENFORCE is equal to zero if
In the event that all firms smuggle a portion of their sales, '1st =7j*,Otherwise, yst =lvi *N1 q l
*+
N2q2 J/[N1ql +N2q2].13
TAXDIF =0.A quadratic in TAXDIF is used to account for possible nonlinearity in the effects of tax
differences,
We choose an exponential form for Yst as well as interact the random error and RP with TAXDTF
because this implies, as it should,=1 (that is.no commercial smuggling) if the lax difference with the
low tax state. and hence the incentive to smuggle (and to enforce against smuggling), is zero. Recall that
in the theoretical model Ti *isa function of the equilibrium aggregate sales in the state Note, how-
ever. in equation (4) the effect is shown to be through the inverse demand equation. Hence we use RP5
in place of Q5.Ouranalysis does not imply a sign on the coefficient of RP. Also recall that the direct
effect of an increase in TAXDIF on 71 *isnegative, but that an increase in TAXDIF also changes total
sales of smugglers and non-smugglers, These latter effects can outweigh the direct effect so that the net
effect is positive. It is nonetheless our expectation that increases in TAXDIF reduce Tst (t <0).
Our measure of the tax differential, TAXDIF5t, is the difference between the tax rate in the sth
state at time t and the tax in North Carolina at time t. As noted above, many of the cigarettes smuggled
by firms are "legal" at the point of origin: that is, smuggling firms pay the state excise tax in North
Carolina, Kentucky, or Virginia. The nominal taxes in these three states were unchanged during (he pe-
dod of our observations at 2, 3, and 2.5cents.respectively. Since North Carolina is considered to be the
primary source of smuggled cigarettes we measure the incentive for firms to smuggle using the difference
in the local state excise (axes and the excise tax in North Carolina. Results change very little if we use
the slate excise tax rate rather than the tax differential given a constant nominal North Carolina tax rate.
In the theoretical model the effect of enforcement is unambiguous. so that we expect ö3 > 0.As
the level of enforcement rises the proportion of legal sales to quantity demanded. 1st. should increase.
However, enforcement is itself a function of the Lax differential: an increase in the tax differential in-
creases the incentive for states to engage in enforcement activities since the returns to enforcement activ-
ityare potentially greater. There is little direct evidence available on the level of anti-smuggling enforce-
ment Other than the tax differential, our evidence includes the date of passage of the Contraband
Cigarette Act, the fact that some states were members of joint enforcement operations, some qualitative
information on the severity of penalties for smuggling, and the rebate offered to wholesalers for each le-14
gal sale.15 The joint enforcement groups were the Interstate Revenue Research Center (IRRC). with
member states MI, MN. IN. IL, OH. FL. and MS. and the Eastern Seaboard Interstate Cigarette Tax En-
forcement Group(ESICTEG). with member states CN. DE. MD, MA. NJ. NY. and PA. The information
on the severity of smuggling penalties is from ACIR (1977) where states are categorized as having light,
moderate, or severe criminal penalties for smuggling. The states in the latter two categories are CA. CIt
MI. NE. NY. Old, and Th. Benjamin (1992) aregues that the payment of a discount or rebate to
wholesalers for each legal sale is a form of enforcement Ostensibly. the discount is to cover the cost of
affixing the tax indica. but it is widely agreed that the rate is substantially in excess of the cost of stamp-
ing the cigarettes and is therefore a disincentive for smuggling.





MEMB =1if the state is a member of 1RRC orESICFEG, 0 otherwise.16
FELONY =1it the state imposes a moderate or severe penalty for cigarette
smuggling. 0 otherwise. -
DISCthe discount rate paid to cigarette wholesalers.
.3
vis a random error assumed to be distributed N(0. a;).
and CCAt captures the effects of the Contraband Cigarette Act in one of two ways:
CCAt =CoD79_90t>CTAXDIF5t+a7D79_901xTAXDIFjwhereD79_90 =1if the year
is a year after 1978 (i.e.. a year in which the Contraband Cigarette Act was in
effect), 0 otherwise, or
15Panof the reason it is hard to measure accurately enforcement activities by state is that enforcement is
undertaken by both state law enforcement and tax agencies. The relative importance of these agencies in
enforcement activities varies from state to state (ACIR. 1977). See also the discussion in MaUi., Edeihurta, and
Chamberlain (1976, especially pages 23-24).
16Weexperimented with separate dummies for membership in IRRC and ES1CEG but results were poot15
CCA1=
CZJ+SDJtXTAXDIF51where=1if the year is the Jth year in which the
Contraband CigaretteAct wasin effect. 0 otherwise. That is.=1if the year
is 1979. 0 otherwise, D2t =1if the year is 1980, 0 otherwise, etc.
The first specification of the period in which the Contraband Cigarette Act was in effect imposes a quad-
ratic structureon the timeeffects of the Act, while the second specification allows the effect to "freely"
vary over the twelve year period. We shall refer to the first (second) model as the CCA-1 (CCA-2)
model.If correct, the first specification is more efficient than the second; however, evidence presented in
ACW(1985)and given in private discussion to the authors suggests that enforcement activity varied
substantially duringthe SO's. We shall return tothis below.
In (12)interaction with TAXDIFis usedsothat the level of enforcement iszero ifthere is no in.
ccntive for firmstosmuggle (TAXDIF =0). Itis expected that membership in IRRC or ESICTEG will
increasethe level of enforcement (a3> 0) and thatmoresevere penalties for smuggling will also havea
positive effecton enforcement (c4 >0). The effectof the passage of the ContrabandCigaretteAct is
generally considered tobean increase in thelevel ofenforcement.
The above implies
(13) = exp((81+83czi)TAXDlF5 +(ö2+83cc2)TAXDW
+ö3a3MEMBXTAXDlF5t+53Q4FELONY5XTAXDIF5t
+S3U5DISC5tXTAXD1F51÷ S3CCAt +
+ wstxTAXDIFst + &3v5txTAXDIF5tI
exp(Zst4+u5tXTAXDIF5t)
where ust =wst+ö3vstis distributed N(0, a) and o =-+- öa.Substituting Qt =ktntand
Qst-i ='—st-ltYst-linto (10) and taking logs gives
(14) htL5 =+ XstP+P8thIstt+ - 38Zt4Q+vst
+ + I8uItst1+(Zst81st1$ +16
where st =st÷ U51XTAXDIF5t —13sust.iXTAXDIFstz.
Note the non-linear restrictions among the cccl ficienis of (14). An estImate of from estimation 01(14),
used in (13) and (11), provides estimates of the extent of commercial smuggling in each state.
Before proceeding to estimation, severaL points need to be made. FUst, the coefficients of(12).
the enforcement equation, are not identified since they are each multiplied by 53. the coefficient of en-
forcement in the equation fory. which is presumed positive. Second. the coefficient of TAXDWSL the
sum of a (presumed) positive, unidentified coefficient (si)'andthe product of two positive, unidentified
coefficients (53 and at), hence TAXDIF5t's coefficient cannot be signed a priori.Likewise.the coeffi-
cient of TAXDIF5 is a combination of unidentified coefficients and cannot be signed. Finally, the vail-
ances a,,, and 0v are not identified.
B. Data and Method of Estimation
We estimate (14) using annual data from 1972 -1990for 39 states plus the District of Columbia.
Our data exclude observations on states with local government excise taxes (AL, IL MO, Ni. NY, and
TN) since the information needed to calculate art effective In nit is unavailable (see also lIT). HI and
AK are excluded since smuggling of cigarettes for these states may be of a distinctly different character-
istic given the necessity of ocean travel or travel through Canada when hauling cbntraband cigarettes.
Observations on NC. KY, arid VA are exduded since they reportedly sources of commercially smuggled
cigarettes. The data are a total of 760 observations (T=19 and N=4CD. In Table 2 are the mean values of
per capita in paid cigarette sales, price, and state tax levels (both in 1990 prices) for the 40 states in our
sample for each of the 19 years.
It is well known that the usual fixed effects (within) estimator (that is, ordinary least squares. In-
strumental variables, generalized least squares. etc., estimators ot(14) after diffeztncing the data from its
"time" means to remove individual effects 5) is inconsistent for fixed T (number of time periods) when
the regressors are not all strictly exogenous. Strict exogenelty fails here because of the presence of the
lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of (14). Hence the preferred approach Is to estimate17
(14)after quasi-differencing the datatoremove individual effects (see Holtz-Eakln. Newey, and Rosen
(L983)andWooldridge(1991)). This view presumes large N and small (and fixed)T. In the present
context.N is fixed (andfairly small) while I is not(at leastconceptually) fixedthoughIt Is small. Hence
any appeal toconsistericyforeli/icrestimator mustreside onthe notionthatI canpotentially increase
without limit; thus neither the usualestimatororestimation afterquasidiffeziencingwould appearto
dominate. We stick with the usual fixed effects estimator.
and Q!(andhence L51) are simultaneously decennined so we use Instrumental variables.In
addition, we allow the possibility that 1st and ENFORCE51 are stochastic by including the disturbances
w5 and 'st- lf 1st and/or ENFORCE5t are indeed stochastic this implies that the disturbances In (14) are
thesumof a heteroscedastic disturbance, Eg.anda heteroscedastic MA(l) process, u51XTAXDIF5t
—Psttst. 1XTAXDIF5t..(.The implied disturbance variance and first oaicrautocovariance in(14) are
') 22 ')'
(15) E(vjj) =a÷ (TAXDIF51 *I3TAXDIFjj..1)o
and
I
(15) E(v5t V5t.l)= 4I8aTAXDIFjj1.
All other elements of the covariance matrix are zero. Since the errors are correlated through time Lj
and RP5i are not independent of the disturbance. To obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of
(14) requires, in addition to an instrument for RP5t, instruments for L.5tj and 11stj. However, if=0
the problem with the endogeneity of L1 and RP51.j disappears.
We begin estimation by testing for the presence of heteroscedasticity in (1) the UsEdueto hetero-
scedasticity in the fraction of legal sales equation (13), and in (ii) the demand equation (10). We use a
likelihood ratio test comparing the alternative model
A 2 2
(17) Vst=05+ Wlta+e5t
against the null model18
(18) v=a +e51
'A 2 A A
whereW51 =crxw; + I38TAXDIF5.i))7and the vst are the residuals and ig Is the estimateof
frominstrumental variables estimation of (14) using instrumenis forRP51.RPst. ndLst 1'
We test for heteroscedasticity using both definitions of CCA1 (models CCA- 1 and CCA-2). and
we estimate (14) both imposing and not imposing the non-linear restrictions among the coefficients. This
gives a total of four tests. As instruments for both retail price and lagged legal sales we use their pre-
dictS value from regressions on the other right hand side variables in (14) as well as lagged income and
two period lags of income and TAXDW: the current, one-period lagged. and two-period lagged state
cigarette tax rate: the current, one-period lagged. and two-period lagged manufacturer's price to wholesal-
ers plus the federal excise tax rate: a dummy variable equal to one for the years when the federal excise
tax was 5.16 and 0 for those years when it was 5.08: and an index of the wage rates of grocery store
workers as well as the one and two-period lags of the index. The results of the four tests is a rejection of
the null model (18) at any reasonable significance level: the largest p-value is 0.0001.
We then tested model (17) venus a model without fixed effects (that Is, model (17) venus the
A)2 1
nullmodel vjj =a+W5a+est),again using a likelihood ratio test. The null model is again rejected
(the largest p-value is .00007) implying heteroscedasticity in the demand equation (10). FinaUy. we
A')')
tested(17) venus the null model vu =+est (that is. fixed effects only). We use Lagrange muttiplier
(LM) tests which are simply the tests for significance of the coefficient of W in (17). 18 The results are
mixed. The p-values for Model CCA- t are both larger than 0.32 while the p-values for CCA-2 are 0.062
and 0.161. Since results are mixed, we estimate the model without the restriction
t7This lest Is similar to the Lagrange multiplier tests suggested by Breusch and Pagan (1979)and While (1980).
Seealso the discussion in Godfrey (1988, pp. 188-190) and references therein regarding application of
heteroscedasticity tests in models with endogenous regressors. 'Notethat the null value (a2 0) lies on the boundary of the parameter space: however, in this case. the LM
statistic is still valid in large samples (Breusch arid Pagan 1979).
19Wealso obtained estimates after imposing the restriction that the variance of ust is zero. Not surprisingly, it
makes almost no difference in the results for Model CCA-l.19
The estimation method is generalized non-linear 2SLS (see. e.g.. Ainenilya, 1985, pp. 240-24!).
IV. TheLevelof Smuggling and Enforcement Results
A.ParwnererEstimates
Estimates of model (14), after imposing the non-linear restrictions among the coefficients, are
foundinTable 3. The naming of wad ables is done in an obvious shorthand. Only CAN is Insignificant
in both models.Ofthe remaining coefficients, onlyINDIANhas a sign that is counter to ourintuition.
Price and income elasticity magnitudes are appealing given the addictive nature of smoking. They tend
to be tower than estimates reported elsewhere. Lcwiu and Coate (1982) and Wasserman. ci. a!. (1990)
review a number of prior studies and report that estimated price elasticities are in the range -.23 to -1.30.
Turning to the variables associated with lst' we first consider the null hypothesis that all coeffi-
cients of the variables inare jointly zero; that Is. we test whether =IVs and I. The p-values for
each of the tests are very close to zero, hence we reject the hypothesis that all are Jointly equal to zero.
The coefficients of TAXDIF and TAXSQ are jointly significantly different from zero at standard signifi-
cance levels for CCA- I and are jointly significantly different from zero at the 11% level 1t CCA-2. Re-
call, however, that their coefficients are combinations of unidentifiable parameters and thelrslgns are In-
determinant, hence, significance or a lack of significance is a moot point. MEMB,FELONY, DISC and
RI' are significant only in Model CCA-2. In that model, the coefficient on membership in anti-smug-
gling organizations has. as expected. a positive effect on the proportion of legal sales, but the coefficients
of FELONY and DISC have signs counter to our expectations.
Recall the quote given earlier attributing reductions in smuggling In the early 80's to passage of
the Contraband Cigareue Act. Our estimates imply the contrary. Holding other factors constant, passage
of the act Is assoc ated with a fall in the proportion of legal sales. Smuggling activity did appear to fall
during the early SO's (see below), but not in response to passage of the Act. In Model CCA- 1. the coeffi-
cient of the linear term (CCAxTAX) associated with the years 1979-92 Is different from zero at standard
significance levels, and the coefficient associated with the quadratic term Is close to being significant at
the 10% level (they are also jointly different from zero with a p-value very close to zero). The linear co-20
efficient Is negative and the quadratic coefficient is positive. The overall effect on the proportion of legal
sales is negative: evaluated at mean regressor values for the period 1979-1990 (the non-zero values for
the CCA term) the quadratic form is negative. Using a different dummy variable (interacted with
TAXDIF) for each year the Act is in effect (CCA-2) shows a negative effect on y for all years except for
1985 (for which the effect is positive but insignificant). For all other years except 1986-87. the estimated
coefficients are significant at the 10% leveL A joint test of whether all the coefficients of these variables
are zero has a p-value close to zero.
What could account for this apparent, and counter-Intuitive, effect of the passage of the Contra-
band Cigarette Act? if we accept the reasonable position that an increase in enforcement Increases the
proportion of legal sales, then we are left with the result that passage of the Act lowered enforcement.
Several hypotheses are possible. but consider the following points. First, broadly speaking, enforcement
activities arc undertaken by two groups: law enforcement agencies and tax administrators. Testimony
before the ACIR clearly indicated the Importance of both groups for effective enforcement. The federal
agency responsible for implementation of the Act, the Bureau of Alcohol. Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF).
cannot supply the second type of enforcement since it is a law enforcement agency. Its personnel are not
tax auditors, and they are allowed to examine records of suspected smugglers only by court order.
Second. the ACIR (1985) expressed concerns "..thatsome states are using federal actions to justify
reducing their rote in enforcing cigarette tax laws." The ACIR concluded that state enforcement efforts
were reduced after the CCA because both the presence of the federal government in enforcement and the
perception that smuggling was lower reduced the returns to state enforcement efforts. Think beginning
in 1980, the federal government began attempts to reduce or etiminate funds appropriated for enforce-
ment of the Contraband Cigarette Act (see ACIR, 1985). We vere told by state tax administrators that
the ATF currently does not allocate any efforts to*ard enforcement. The smuggling problem is believed
to have disappeared and the states have been told that the AW will reinstate enforcement efforts if the
states feel smuggling has agate become a problem. Finally, these administrators claim that. by and large,
cigarette smuggling Is not delectable unless an agency Is actively looking for smuggling -21
Based on the above we hypothesize the following as an explanation of the adverse effect of
passage of the Contraband Cigarette Act. Many states reduced enforcement activity because of the pres-
ence of federal enforcement activities. The ATF, being only a law enforcement agency, and not an
agency of tax auditors, is less effective per dollar spent on enforcement than are the states which have
both law enforcement and tax auditing capabilities. Beginning before passage of the Act, smuggling
activity had been declining and continued to dedine after a jump in 1979 (we turn to this below) leaving
the impression that the ATF was indeed quite effective. With the Impression that smuggling was
disappearing, the states did not search for smugglers, and hence were not in a position to determine the
adverse effects of the AcL
B.Level of Smuggling and Revenue Effects
Estimatesof the parameters of thefunction permit estimation of thelevel ofcommercial
smuggling. Estimates are presented in Table4under two scenarios. In the first we estimate commercial
smugglingimpliedbyModelsCCA-landCCA-2(the"With CCA" columns of Table 4). We thenit-
estimatesmuggling assuming that the Contraband Cigazene Act was never passed. In the latter experi'
ment we set to zero all variables associated with the Act for aD years rather than just the years prior to
1979 (the "Without CCA" columns of Table 4); that is, CCA1 =0V t, The columns titled "%Smug" In
Table 4 give the average values of the percent of total sales (IOOx(l -1st))commercIally smuggled Into
the 40 states in our sample for each of the 19 years. Presented also are the estimated standard errors for
these averages (columns "SE"). The standard errors are based upon the standard errors for the estimated
parameters. Asymptotic statistical theoiy suggests normality of the estimated ys. Also presented art
the average per capita packs of cigarettes smuggled in the 40 stases (columns Smug). For sonic states
and time periods the value of i' is greater than one implying no smuggling. The columns "%Smug" are
based on the estimated value of y regardless of whether or not it is above or below one: this allows for a
correct estimated variance. However, the columns "Smug" are calculated by setting to one any value oty
in excess of one. This change is relevant for Model CCA-2 for which about 20% of the estimated ys are
greaterthan one.22
Smuggling activity was generally declining from 1972until 1979when ittakes a jump before
continuing its downward trend before turning up in the late 80's. In the absence of the Contraband Ciga-
rent Act there would not have been a jump in 1979. Model CCA-l (Model CCA-2) implies that smug-
gling was higher in 1979 by about two (one) packs of cigarettes per capita due to changes following pas-
sage of the Act. Note in Model CCA-2 that estimates of the percent smuggled are not significantly dif-
ferent from zero in years 1985 and 1986.
In Table 5 are presented revenues aswellas revenue losses for the 19 years in our sample. Here
again we set to one any value of yin excess of one. "Revenue Received" is the total revenue received by'
the states in our sample. "Revenue Lost" is the amount that would have been received in the absence of
organized smuggling. "Ratio" is the ratio of Revenue Lost to the sum of Revenue Lost and Revenue Re-
ceived. We also compute the values in the absence of the Contraband Cigarette AcL The Implied
aggregate revenue losses for the period 1979 -1990due to reduced enforcement after passage of the Act
is 5828 million and $1,103 million for Models CCA-l and CCA-2.
Are the smuggling numbers reported in Tables 4 and 5 reasonable? In the 1985 ACIR report it is
claimed that cigarette tax evasion had declined 45% between 1975 and 1985. Our estimates of the de-
cline in smuggling based on Models CCA-1 and CCA-2 (using columns Smug) are 28% and 49.%, re-
spectively. The number reported by the ACifi includes all foams of smuggling for all stales while ours is
an estimate of the decline in organized smuggling for the 40 states in our sample. On the revenue side,
the 1977 ACIR report claims a loss in 1976 of 5900 million (using in 1990 dollars) in tax revenues from
all forms of cigarette smuggling. Their figure includes gains to those states that attract consumers from
neighboring states. Our estimate of the loss from organized smuggling is 5635millionand $278 million
for Models CCA- I and CCA-2. respectively. If all contiguous states except KY, NC, and VA are in-
cluded, our estimates of the losses are $865 million and 5313 million for Models CCA-l and CCA-2. re-
spectively. These last figures, of course, do not include losses on local cigarette taxes.23
V. NonconstantElasticityModels
Wasserman, a. at,reportevidence suggesting non-constant price and income elasticities of de-
mand for cigarettes. Their regressions use not only income and the log of puce, but also those variables
interacted with a time trend.2° We alter our empirical models by introducing the interaction of the time
trend with the logs of price and income. We refer to these new models as CCA-lt and CCA-2t. The
regression results are in Table 6. Wasserman, ci. at. found that the estimated income elasticity of de-
mand went from positive and significantly different from zero in 1970 to negative and Insignificant in
1988. They further report that consumers became more sensitive to prtce as time passed. Both Models
CCA-lt and CCA-2t imply a falling income elasticity of demand. However, the evidence in the two
models concerning the price elasticity of demand is contradictory. Table 7 gives the elasticity by year
and model along with the standard error (or the elasticity (columns "SE"). In every case the puce and in-
come elasticities of demand are significantly different for zero at commonly used significance levels.
Note that the coefficients of TREND in both CCA-lt and CCA-2t are positive (though only mar-
ginally significant in CCA- it). This implies that, holding constant other factors that influence cigarette
consumption and allowing for nonconstant price and income elasticities, cigarette consumption has been
increasing over time. This effect is counter to commonly held beliefs about changing cigarette habits.
Tables 8 and 9 report the smuggling and revenue effects of smuggling for the models with
trending elasticities. The evidence on smuggling and us revenue effects are very similar to that observed
with the earlier models. In particular. there is a jump in smuggling associated with the passage of the
Contraband Cigarette Act.
VI. Federal Excise Taxes and Smuggling
It has been proposed by the Clinton administration (and others) that the federal excise tax on
cigarettes be raised from the current 24 cents per pack to anywhere from 50centsto $2. The purpose is
not only to raise federal revenues but also to discourage cigarette smoking.
20Note, however, that Laughunn and Lyon (1971) report no such interaction effects.24
What effect might these proposed increases have on commercial smuggling? In the development
of the theoretical model we showed that the federal tax affects sm.uggling only indirectly through its
effects on equilibrium sales. With the exception of linear demand, an increase in the federal tax has an
ambiguous effect on the level of organized smuggling. In our empirical model this tax is embedded
(enters) in the retail price term which appears both in the demand equation (10) and the legal sales
equation (12). An increase in the excise tax. all else equal. will increase price, hence an analysis of
changes in smuggling pre and post 1983. the only year in our sample in which the federal excise tax was
changed. might shed light on the effects of federal taxes on organized smuggling. Unfortunately, we are
unable. with the model as expressed above, to separate changes in retail price due to, say, shifts in labor
costs, from changes due to excise tax changes. To remedy this we rn-estimate (14) after introducing the
federal excise tax directly into they function (12). This allows us to measure the effect on the level of
legal sales of a change in excise tax. holding constant retail price. The fact that we now introduce the
excise tax as wellasretail price does not imply misspecification in the models estimated earlier. This
follows from the fact that the excise taxes were included in our earlier models, albeit indirectly. Note
that we cannot simply enter the excise tax as one regressor and the difference between the retail price and
the excise tax since, in general. only a portion of the tax will appear in the price term.
Models CCA- 1. CCA-2. CCA- It. and CCA-2t were reestimated after introducing the level of the
federal excise tax into the y function. In every case the coefficient of the federal excise tax was negative
and significant implying decreases in the proportion of legal sales with increases in the federal excise tax.
While federal tax collections might well rise, state collections will fall. The implied elasticities ofywith
respect to the federal excise tax ranged from -.031 to -.076. We continue to find that passage of the
Contraband Cigarette Act is associated with an increase in smuggling.
Although our estimate of 1t differs somewhat from its theoretical analog, the theory is useful for
understanding why y might decrease with an increase in the federal tax. Recall that y5 =(71*Nlql* +
N2qzuJ4Nlql*+N2q2*J.Since the sign of aqj*/aTf is ambiguous. any empirical result is consistent
with the theory. However, if demand is linear or not too convex, &q MTfc 0 for i =1.2.This is the
intuitively expected result since an increase in the federal tax increases per unit cost of both smuggled25
and legal units sold. In this case. 1st will decrease for N fixed, if the response of a legal trader is greater
than that of a smuggler. Although it is not included in our theoretical model, an increase in the federal
tax may induce firmstoexit, in which case lst is more likely to decrease if N2 decreases more than N1.
VU. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we developa theoreticaland empirical model that permits estimation of the level of
organized smuggling of cigarettes out of the low-tax and cigaretteproducingstates NC, KY. and VA.
The level of smuggling, as well as the generally decreasing trend in that level, accords well with evidence
presented in the 1977 and 1985 ACIR reports. We find two important policy results. First, passage of
the federal Contraband Cigarette Act did not deter smuggling, as has been claimed. Those who have
claimed success for the Act interpreted the general decline in cigarette smuggling from levels in the 70's
to much lower levels in the 80's as evidence of its success. We find, however, that the decline was not
due to passage of the Act, Rather, it followed from generally decreasing real levels of state tax differen-
tials. In every model we estimate we find an increase in smuggling following passage of the Act; this
increase is then followed by a continuation of the downward trend in cigaretLe smuggling.
Second, we find that increases in the federal excise tax are associated with a greater proportion of
smuggled cigarettes. Proposed increases in the excise tax may well operate, as hoped. to raise federaL tax
revenues and lower the level of cigarette smoking, but it will also serve to increase the proportion of
smuggled cigarettes and thereby reduce state revenues. This result has not been anticipated by
government officials or previous studies of smuggling. Officials are clearly aware that changes in the
federal tax could affect consumers smuggling across the Canadian and Mexican borders, but our results
come from examining commerica] smuggling. Since previous studies have tended to focus on smuggling
by consumers, the effects we find have been unnoticed.26
Table1: Per Capita Tax Paid Sales in the U.S.
and Out-Smuggling States
Year Ky NC VA Mean U.S.
1965 129 NA 123 127
1970 156 172 124 118
1975 223 226 153 13
1978 225 206 156 134
1980 215 188 149 133
1985 182 156 135 122
1990 183 134 119 104
Dataarefrom The Tobacco Institute (1990).27
Table2: Per Capita Tax Paid Sales,
Avenge Price, and Avenge Tax
Year Per Capita Tax Price Tax
Paid Sales
1972 128.4 1.261 0.313
1973 129.8 1.225 0.301
1974 132.0 1.179 0.275
1975 133.1 1.166 0.261
1976 135.8 1.132 0.251
1977 135.2 1.185 0.243
1978 134.8 1.146 0.226
1979 132.8 1.084 0.207
1980 133.0 1.005 0.184
1981 133.4 1.011 0.172
1982 131.2 1.108 0.175
1983 126.0 1.226 0.186
1984 120.4 1.241 0.181
1985 118.7 1.274 0.189
1986 116.0 1.336 0.196
1987 113.2 1.395 0.212
1988 109.1 1.464 0.208
1989 104.8 1.532 0.219
1990 99.9 1335 011828
Table3:Models CCA-1 andCCA-2
CCA-1 CCA-2
Coef c-Ratio Cod c-Ratio
Demand Parameters
taRP -0.0700 -4.3806 -0.2581 -7.6610
InJNC 0.0687 3.9518 0.1089 5.1118
TREND -0.0048-13.2096 -0.005 1 -7 .2775
ln(AVRP/RP) 0.0296 1.0286 0.1492 3.6590
InLAGSALES 0.8434 36.2553 0.4597123385
CAN 0.0044 0.63 13 -0.0101 -1.1596
INDIAN 0.0069 4.3364 0.0149 7.4890
MILTARY -0.0068 -1.6361 -0.0104 -2.1939
Fnction Legal Sales Parameters
TAXDIF -0:4625 -3.1696 -0.2730 -1.5156
TAXSQ -0.3510 -1.5649 -0.4030 -1.5064
MEMB -0.0104 -0.1375 0.3717 9.4536
FELONY -0.0608 -0.8762 -0.2894 -7.3663
DISC 0.0097 1.0566 -0.0294 -5.2880

















With CCA Without CCA
Year %Smug SESmug %Smug ScSmug
Model CCA-1
1972 9.180.337 14.50 9.180.33714.50
1973 9.360326 14.89 9.360.32614.89
1974 8.700.316 13.91 830 0.3 16 13.91
1975 8.040303 12.59 8.040.30312.59
1976 7.810.300 12.26 7.810.30012.26
1977 7.600.284 11.90 7.600.28411.90
1978 7.230.273 11.44 7230273 11.44
1979 8.030.257 12.37 6.62025610.25
J980 7.490.242 11.47 6.090.239 9.34
1981 7.020.230 10.64 5.640.225 8.56
1982 6.850.225 10.16 5.470.220 8.12
1983 6.850.228 9.82 5.480.220 7.85
1984 6.910.236 9.13 5.520.226 7.26
1985 6.81 0.236 8.90 5.41.0.226 7.05
1986 7.050.247 8.81 5.650.238 6.99
1987 7.030.251 8.50 5.640243 6.73
1988 7.340.265 8.50 5.940258 6.81
1989 7.230,274 8.68 5.820.266 6.97
1990 7.260284 8.50 5.890.279 6.93
Model CCA-2
1972 4.020.427 6.73 4.020.427 6:73
1973 4.080,403 6.72 4.080.403 6.72
1974 4.200.371 6.65 4.200.371 6.65
1975 3.900.354 6.12 3.900354 6.12
1976 3.490.356 5.76 3.490.356 5.76
1977 3.070.342 5.21 3.070.342 5.21
1978 2.190243 4.27 2.190.343 4.27
1979 3.110,297 4.86 2.060.311 3.84
1980 3.680288 5.29 2.000.285 3.60
1981 5.040269 6.72 1.740.267 3.18
1982 4.480.244 5.81 1.530.267 2.81
1983 3.100.243 4.12 0.800.291 2.01
1984 2.910.253 3.66 0.170.323 1,44
1985 -0.380.267 1.05 0.090.327 1.36
1986. 0.460.261 1.59 -0.040.355 1.27
1987 0.690.274 1.65 -0.280.372 1.07
1988 2.560.273 2.98 -0.660.410 0.84
1989 4.710.280 5.38 -0.990.438 1.11
1990 7.290.279 8.15 -1.230.477 1.1130
Table 5: Revenue Effects
With CCA Without CCA
Revenue Revenue Revenue
Year Received Lost Ratio Lost Ratio
Model CCA-1
1972 7081630 966922 0.120 966922 0.120
1973 7005291 963137 0.121 963137 0.121
1974 6547196 808564 0.110 808564 0.110
1975 6053877 670962 0.100 670962 0.100
1976 5980019 635098 0.096 635098 0.096
1977 5677877 580740 0.093 580740 0.093
1978 5583805 542258 0.089 542258 0.089
1979 5019042 525778 0.095 442171 0.081
1980 4560397 439758 0.088 362689 0.0'74
1981 4216295 376256 0.082 305711 0.068
1982 4094050 352614 0.079 284306 0.065
1983 4113346 360596 0.081 291654 0.066
1984 3960401 338867 0.079 272930 0.064
1985 3889966r 327394 0.078 262954 0.063
1986 3954004 336542 0.078 270732 0.064
1987 3882539 328943 0.078 264513 0.064
1988 3943635 352056 0.082 287163 0.068
1989 4034206 369842 0.084 301186 0.069
1990 4030457 396845 0.090 331052 0.076
Model CCA-2
1972 7081630 426830 0.057 426830 0.057
1973 7005291 411377 0.055 411377 0.055
1974 6547196 366940 0.053 366940 0.053
1975 6053877 310686 0.049 310686 0.049
1976 5980019 278362 0.044 278362 0.044
1977 5677877 236602 0.040 236602 0.040
1978 5583805 183821 0.032 183821 0.032
1979 5019042 190060 0.036 149788 0.029
1980 4560397 187928 0.040 127674 0.027
1981 4216295 220937 0.050 103201 0.024
1982 4094050 189336 0.044 90015 0.022
1983 4113346 141909 0.033 66514 0.016
1984 3960401 124663 0.031 46388 0.012
1985 3889966 33976 0.009 44377 0.011
1986 3954004 56479 0.014 44826 0.011
1987 3882539 58689 0.015 37321 0.010
1988 3943635 117038 0.029 30947 0.008
1989 4034206 229693 0.054 46906 0.011
1990 4030457 403837 0.091 63805 0.01631
Table 6: ModeLs CCA-lt and CCA-21
Coef t-raUo Cod t-raüo
Demand Pawneters
1nRP -0.0523 -1.7300 -0.3442 -6.4845
t*InRP -0.0043 -2.0064 0.0126 3. 1521
InINC 0.1665 5. 1201 0.2882 8.3356
t*1nINC -0.0040 -2.7050 -0.0128-8.1539
TREND 0.0057 1.5856 0.0246 6.3777
ln(AVRP/RP) 0.0837 2.5287 0.1862 5.0073
InLAGSALES 0.7788 25.5725 03416 15.1428
CAN 0.0005 0.0718 -0.0214 -2.5170
INDIAN 0.0092 5.2346 0.0169 7.85 14
MILITARY -0.0057 -1.3215 -0.0050-1.1377
Fraction Legal Sates Parameters
TAXDIF -0.5523 -3.5632 -0.6003-3.2178
TAXSQ -0.5838 -2.6004 0.1012 0.3576
MEMB -0.0242 -0.3341 0.1461 3.2422
FELONY -0.1054 -1.5920 -0.3062 -7 .5554
DSCNT 0.0094 1.0731 -0.0012-0.2129














090 -0.4490 -3.0 127
P-Square 0.9235 0.912232
Table 7: Price and Income Elasticity Estimates: Models CCA-1t and CCA-2t
Year Price EIas. (SE) Income (SE)
SaL
Model CCA-lt
1972 -0.0566 (0.0287) 0.1625 (0.0313)
1973 -0.0609 (0.0272) 0.1585 (0+0301)
1974 -0.0652 (0.0257) 0.1545 (0.0289)
1975 -0.0695 (0.0244) 0.1505 (0.0277)
1976 -0.0738 (0.0232) 0.1465 (0.0266)
1977 -0.0781 (0.0222) 0.1425 (0.0255)
1978 -0.0824 (0.0213) 0.1385 (0.0244)
1979 -0.0867 (0.0206) 0.1345 (0.0234)
1980 -0.0910 (0.0200) 0.1305 (0.0224)
1981 -0.0953 (0.0197) 0.1265 (0,0215)
1982 -0.0996 (0.0197) 0.1225 (0.0207)
1983 -0.1039 (0.0198) 0.1185 (0.0199)
1984 -0.1082 (0.0202) 0.1145 (0.0292)
1985 -0.1125 (0.0208) 0.1105 (0.0187)
1986 -0.1168 (0.0215) 0.1065 (0.0182)
1987 -0.1211 (0.0225) 0. 1025 (0.0178)
1988 -0.1254 (0.0236) 0.0985 (0.0175)
1989 -0.1297 (0.0248) 0.0945 (0.0174)
1990 -0.1340 (0.0262) 0.0905 (0.0174)
Model CCA-2t
1972 -0.3316 (0.0499) 0.2754 (0.0333)
1973 -0.3190 (0.0469) 0.2626 (0.0320)
1974 -0.3064 (0.0440) 0.2498 (0.0307)
1975 -0.2938 (0.0412) 0.2370 (0.0295)
1976 -0.2812 (0.0388) 0.2242 (0.0283)
1977 -0.2686 (0.0366) 0.2114 (0.0271)
197€ -0.2560 (0.0347) 0.1986 (0.0260)
1979 -0.2434 (0.0332) 0.1858 (0.0250)
1980 -0.2308 (0.0322) 0.1730 (0.0239)
1981 -0.2182 (0.0316) 0.1602 (0.0230)
1982 -0.2056 (0.0315) 0.1474 (0.0221)
1983 -0.1930 (0.0319) 0.1346 (0.0213)
1984 -0.1804 (0.0328) 0.1218 (0.0206)
1985 -0.1678 (0.034 1) 0.1090 (0.0200)
1986 -0.1552 (0.0359) 0,0962 (0.0195)
1987 -0.1426 (0.0380) 0.0834 (0.0191)
1988 -0.1300 (0.0403) 0,0706 (0,0188)
1989 -0.1174 (0.0430) 0.0578 (0.0187)
1990 -0.1048 (0.0458) 0.0450 (0.0187)33
Table 8: Smuggling Estimates
With CCA Without CCA
Year %Smug SESmug %Smug SeSmug
Model CCA-lr
1972 8.410.35713.72 8.410357 13.72
1973 8.820.34214.48 8.820.342 14.48
1974 8.390.327 13.80 8.390.327 13.80
1975 7.720.31212.40 7.720.312 12.40
1976 7.390.30911.89 7.390.309 11.89
1977 7.280.293 11.71 7.280293 11.71
1978 6.740.28210.91 6.740.282 10.91
1979 7.720.26212.06 6290.262 9.96
1980 7.340.24611.44 5.91 0.244 9.30
1981 6.940.23410.70 5.520230 8.58
1982 6.660,23010.04 5.24 0.225 7.95
1983 6.370.234 9.24 4.95 0.227 7.24
1984 6.150.244 8.24 4.710235 6.35
1985 5.980.245 7.94 4.540235 6.07
1986 6.060.257 7.66 4.630.250 5.83
1987 5.920.263 7.26 4.49 0.255 5.49
1988 6.040.278 7.11 4.62 0.273 5.43
1989 5.750.289 7.14 4.32 0.283 5.45
1990 5.580.302 6.73 4.190298 5.21
Model CCA-it
1972 4.01 0.430 6.69 4.010.430 6.69
1973 4.61 0.400 7.24 4.610.400 7.24
1974 5.13 0.362 7.74 5.130.362 -7.74
1975 5.04 0.343 7.52 5.040.343 7.52
1976 4.75 0.344 7.20 4.750.344 7.20
1977 4.87 0.327 7.38 4.870.327 7.38
1978 4.41 0.325 6.66 4.410.325 6.66
1979 5.66 0.282 8.42 4.480.295 6.61
1980 5.20 0.290 7.76 4.530270 6.73
1981 5.89 0.268 8.77 4.390.253 6.47
1982 5.420.237 7.88 4.150253 5.98
1983 4.67 0.240 6.48 3.650272 5.03
1984 4.87 0.256 6.28 3.200.301 4.12
1985 0.65 0.280 1.66 3.060.305 3.91
1986 2.42 0.276 3.16 2.880.332 3.60
1987 2.41 0.313 3.03 2.660.348 3.26
1988 4.310334 4.87 2.410.384 3.01
•1989 7.03 0.382 8.77 2.150.410 3.31
1990 10.51 0.41513.17 1.870.447 3.0534
TaMe 9: Revenue Effects
With CCA Without CCA
Revenue Revenue Revenue
Year Received Lost Ratio Los; Ratio
Model CCA- it
1972 7081630 917964 0.115 917964 0.115
1973 7005291 941067 0.118 941067 0.118
1974 6547196 205636 0.110 805636 0.110
1975 6053877 663137 0.099 663137 0.099
1976 5980019 617870 0.094 617870 0.094
1977 5677877 573191 0.092 573191 0.092
1978 5583805 519409 0.085 519409 0.085
1979 5019042 512187 0.093 431218 0.079
1980 4560397 438493 0.088 361714 0.073
1981 4216295 377832 0.082 306428 0.068
1982 4094050 347499 0.078 278201 0.064
1983 4113346 339216 0.076 269970 0.062
1984 3960401 305554 0.072 239610 0.057
1985 3889966 291054 0.070 226665 0.055
1986 3954004 291740 0.069 226428 0.054
1987 3882539 279180 0.067 215462 0.053
1988 3943635 291589 0,069 228448 0.055
1989 4034206 302374 0.070 235502 0.055
1990 4030457 314988 0.072 252761 0.059
Model CCA-2t
1972 7081630 368813 0.050 368813 0.050
1973 7005291 399407 0.054 399407 0.054
1974 6547196 393214 0.057 393214 0.057
1975 6053877 355623 0.055 355623 0.055
1976 5980019 325091 0.052 325091 0.052
1977 5677877 318540 0.053 318540 0.053
1978 5583805 273812 0.047 273812 0.047
1979 5019042 328730 0.061 251334 0.048
1980 4560397 275287 0.057 235632 0.049
1981 4216295 292309 0.065 210173 0.047
1982 4094050 257812 0.059 191381 0.045
1983 4113346 225672 0.052 172141 0.040
1984 3960401 219571 0.053 139236 0.034
1985 3889966 50634 0.013 130674 0.033
1986 3954004 108155 0.027 124554 0.031
1987 3882539 102754 0.026 111247 0.028
1988 3943635 183526 0.044 109087 0.027
1989 4034206 366099 0.083 135674 0.033
1990 4030457 626096 0.134 153005 0.03735
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